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Objective: The present research examined whether concurrent expert testimony (“hot tubbing”) and courtappointed testimony reduced adversarial allegiance in clinical experts’ judgments compared with traditional
adversarial expert testimony. Hypotheses: We predicted Hypothesis 1: Defense experts would render more not
responsible judgments and lower ratings of criminal responsibility than would prosecution experts; Hypothesis
2: Adversarial allegiance effects on experts’ judgments would be heightened for adversarial experts and attenuated for concurrent experts over time; Hypothesis 3: Adversarial and concurrent experts would report higher
dissonance than would court-appointed experts and adversarial experts’ ratings would increase over time, concurrent experts’ ratings would decrease, and court-appointed experts’ ratings would remain unchanged.
Method: Clinicians and advanced clinical doctoral students conducted simulated criminal responsibility evaluations for the prosecution, defense, or court. We categorized participants as favoring the prosecution or defense
based on their preexisting attitudes and randomly assigned them to the adversarial, concurrent, or courtappointed expert testimony conditions. Participants completed a dichotomous responsibility judgment, strength
of responsibility ratings, and cognitive dissonance measure after initial evidence review (n = 93), report completion (n = 52), and testimony (n = 48). Concurrent experts generated a joint report outlining areas of agreement and disagreement before providing testimony. Results: Concurrent testimony did not eliminate
adversarial allegiance. Adversarial and concurrent experts’ perceptions of responsibility did not signiﬁcantly
differ (d = .04, 95% CI [.64, .71]) or change over time (h2p = .03); however, prosecution experts—across testimony types—rated the defendant as signiﬁcantly more responsible than did defense experts (d = 1.87, 95%
CI [1.06, 2.67]). Concurrent and adversarial experts did not differ in their reports and minimally differed in testimony content. Conclusions: Experts who initially favored the prosecution or defense showed adversarial allegiance regardless of expert testimony method, and we observed no attenuation of this bias over the course of
their case involvement.
Public Significance Statement
Two alternatives to traditional adversarial expert testimony are concurrent testimony, in which
opposing experts collaborate on a report to the court and testify together, and court-appointed testimony. Concurrent testimony did not reduce or eliminate experts’ initial bias in favor of the prosecution or defense when rendering judgments during a simulated criminal responsibility hearing; courtappointed experts’ judgments remained moderate, but that may reﬂect an aggregation of biased
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judgments rather than attenuation of bias. Additional research examining concurrent testimony and
other potential alternatives, such as joint conferences between opposing experts before examining
evidence and writing reports, is necessary to help inform the legal system’s efforts to minimize the
undesirable effects of adversarial allegiance in trials.
Keywords: expert testimony, adversarial allegiance, cognitive bias, forensic assessment

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Supplemental materials: https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000446.supp

Undoubtedly there is a natural bias to do something serviceable for
those who employ you and adequately remunerate you. It is very natural, and it is so effectual that we constantly see persons, instead of considering themselves witness, rather consider themselves as the paid
agents of the persons who employ them.
(Lord Arbinger v Ashton, 1873, p. 374)

In legal cases, complex information is often presented to jurors
who may not have the necessary background to use it effectively.
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) provide for expert witnesses
in these circumstances to “help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue” (Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C., 2020, Rule 702). Although the FRE only apply
in federal cases, many states use similar rules. By specifying testimony must be reliable, based on sufﬁcient knowledge, and speak
the “truth,” the FRE implicitly embed in this requirement the expectation that experts be neutral (Saks, 1990). In psychology, this
expectation is explicit in the American Psychological Association’s Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology (American
Psychological Association, 2013). The guidelines state forensic
psychologists must be impartial, fair, and independent and “strive
to resist partisan pressures to provide services in any ways that
might tend to be misleading or inaccurate” (APA, 2013, p. 8). This
demand for expert neutrality is not limited to the psychology profession; professional societies in other disciplines make similar
calls for the avoidance of partisanship (Saks, 1990).
Despite these calls for professional neutrality, judges and other
legal professionals have long expressed concerns about experts
being biased or “hired guns” (e.g., Edens et al., 2012; Krafka et
al., 2002; Stridbeck et al., 2016). Likewise, governmental review
boards have expressed similar concerns in criticizing the usage of
certain sciences in court (National Research Council, & Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community,
2009; PCAST, 2016). Given experts’ “tremendous power” in the
courtroom to inﬂuence judges and jurors (DeMatteo et al., 2019,
p. 129), these concerns are justiﬁed. Moreover, research supports
these concerns, showing being hired by a particular side unintentionally biases experts toward that side (e.g., Murrie et al., 2009;
Otto, 1989; Zusman & Simon, 1983), and experts intentionally
may agree only to represent the side that is consistent with their
preexisting biases (Neal, 2016). Compounding this issue, most
experts are unaware of their own biases, incorrectly assuming it is
a problem for other experts but not for themselves (Zapf et al.,
2018). As a result, attention has shifted toward promoting interventions to prevent or reduce expert bias. These recommendations
have included changing how experts perform their evaluations by
using debiasing strategies (Neal & Brodsky, 2014, 2016), masking
experts to the hiring party (Robertson, 2010; Slobogin, 2014), or

changing the process of expert testimony altogether through techniques like court-appointed experts or concurrent expert testimony
(Butt, 2017; Yarnall, 2009).
Proponents of concurrent expert testimony, colloquially known
as “hot tubbing,” have argued this technique reduces expert bias
by enhancing neutrality through proximity with the experts on the
opposing side (Edmond, 2008, 2009; Garbis, 2003) and increasing
the clarity and quality of the expert testimony (Downes, 2004;
McClellan, 2007). Despite a large number of legal professionals
calling for its implementation (e.g., Kristjanson, 2012; Wood,
2007a, 2018), concurrent expert testimony has been the subject of
almost no empirical study.

Adversarial Allegiance
Adversarial allegiance refers to the unconscious tendency of
experts to interpret evidence in line with the side that has hired
them (Murrie et al., 2009; Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015). Rather
than the deliberate bias of “hired guns,” adversarial allegiance has
primarily been explained via cognitive biases (Neal & Grisso,
2014). By committing to represent a side, tension may arise
between an expert’s perceived role as an advocate and their professional and ethical duty of impartiality. This commitment to a
course of action incompatible with the professional expectation of
neutrality may lead to cognitive dissonance (Brehm & Cohen,
1962), further exacerbated by pressure from the hiring attorney
and the knowledge that performance in the current case can affect
the experts’ ability to be hired in future cases (Krauss et al., 2018;
Murrie et al., 2013).
According to dissonance theory, resolving cognitive dissonance
requires individuals to change their attitudes, trivialize the importance of their original attitudes, or change their thoughts or behaviors (Festinger, 1957). The chosen method often depends on which
is least resistant to change (Brehm & Cohen, 1962). For an expert,
there are few opportunities to reduce dissonance. Certainly, an
expert may take back the agreement to testify, but this retraction is
likely to have a negative impact on their ability to gain future
work. Moreover, experts presumably will not trivialize the importance of neutrality, because most experts recognize its importance
(Zapf et al., 2018). Instead, experts may unknowingly reduce dissonance by searching for and interpreting evidence in a manner
that will justify their position in the case (Hart et al., 2009; Neal &
Grisso, 2014). Indeed, such a defense motivation has a greater
inﬂuence on search strategies than an accuracy motivation (Hart et
al., 2009). By engaging in a biased information search, experts can
resolve their cognitive dissonance by deciding that they are acting
in line with their professional ethics, because they came to the correct conclusion anyway.
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Resolving cognitive dissonance in the above manner is consistent
with conﬁrmation bias, the tendency to search for or interpret information in a manner consistent with prior beliefs and attitudes (Jonas et al.,
2001; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). The
tendency to engage in conﬁrmation bias can be exacerbated by multiple commitments (Joule & Azdia, 2003). Beyond the initial commitment to represent a particular side, experts actually engage in multiple
points of commitment throughout the testimony process. As the experts
review information in the case that challenges that side and exacerbates
dissonance, experts must engage in more motivated reasoning to
reduce that dissonance (Neal & Grisso, 2014). This escalating commitment is further strengthened by the overall testimony process: Experts
ﬁrst come to an opinion that their lawyers accept, then write expert
reports explaining that opinion, then testify at court about those opinions. Experts recommit to their opinion at each step. This escalating
commitment may drive experts’ opinions to become even stronger
over time, as research suggests dissonance effects are additive and lead
to increased conﬁrmation bias (Jonas et al., 2001; Joule & Azdia,
2003). Thus, the adversarial system encourages experts to become
more extreme in their opinions as they progress through a case.
Adversarial allegiance occurs among experts in sexual risk
assessment evaluations (e.g., Murrie et al., 2009), civil litigation
assessments (Zusman & Simon, 1983), evaluations of child interviews in child sexual abuse cases (McAuliff & Arter, 2016), and
insanity evaluations (Otto, 1989). Even supposedly objective evaluations such as actuarial risk assessments—which may rely purely
on background information in someone’s records—are impacted
by adversarial allegiance (Chevalier et al., 2015; Murrie et al.,
2008, 2009). With evidence of adversarial allegiance well-established, attention has now shifted to methods for reducing adversarial allegiance and expert bias (e.g., Neal & Brodsky, 2016; Neal
& Grisso, 2014).

Court-Appointed Experts
One alternative to the typical adversarial expert process is the
use of court-appointed experts. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 speciﬁcally provides for the use of court-appointed experts (Federal
Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C., 2020), which means they can be
easily employed in the United States even if available evidence
suggests they are not often used (Cecil & Willging, 1994; Champagne et al., 1996; Sward, 1989).
Proponents for court-appointed testimony argue that being hired
by the court rather than a side naturally promotes expert impartiality (Malsch & Freckelton, 2005; Perez, 2016; Worthington et al.,
2002), a view shared by legal professionals (Dattilio et al., 2006;
Lindsay et al., 1990). Some evidence suggests, however, that
court-appointed experts may instead function like prosecution
experts (Blais & Forth, 2014), and court-appointed experts show
preference for prosecutors over defense attorneys (Grøndahl et al.,
2013). Furthermore, using a single court-appointed expert may
make it more likely for experts’ personal biases to inﬂuence their
perception of the case evidence (Sonenshein & Fitzpatrick, 2013;
Yarnall, 2009) or may inadequately convey the amount of dispute
in a particular area (Edmond, 2009; Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015;
Yarnall, 2009). Given court-appointed experts are supposedly in a
neutral role, however, it is unlikely that they will experience dissonance that would lead to a strengthening of their position over the
course of the case. Instead, personal biases would more readily
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inﬂuence court-appointed experts’ views of the case, allowing
those views to persist throughout the process.

Concurrent Expert Testimony
The long-established mechanism of court-appointed testimony is
suggested to reform expert testimony with only modest changes to
implement. In contrast, concurrent expert testimony represents a relatively novel alternative with substantive changes to the typical adversarial expert process. Concurrent expert testimony, or hot tubbing, is a
process that began in Australia and has spread to several other countries (Butt, 2017). In its traditional form, hot tubbing involves experts
from opposing sides directly interacting at several stages in the testimony process (Edmond, 2008, 2009). The experts ﬁrst meet in a pretrial conference, ideally without attorneys present (Edmond, 2003,
2008, 2009), to identify areas of agreement and outstanding issues to
be discussed at trial (Edmond, 2003; McClellan, 2007). After these
issues have been laid out and agreed to by the experts, the experts produce a joint report that delineates those areas of agreement as well as
the areas of dispute. The experts note their respective positions on any
areas of disagreement, and testimony is limited at trial to these areas of
disagreement (Edmond, 2008, 2009). By narrowing the scope of testimony to just the areas of disagreement, hot tubbing is purported to
improve the ability of fact ﬁnders to understand and evaluate trial evidence (Sanders, 2007).
The hot tubbing process continues after the pretrial conference, and it is set up to continue reinforcing proximity with the
opposing experts. Opposing experts sit and testify together on
the stand during trial (Downes, 2004; McClellan, 2007). The
ﬁrst phase of testimony functions more freely and less formally
than typical direct examination, as experts can simply provide
their interpretation of the case and the reasons for it (Edmond,
2008, 2009; Garbis, 2003). The experts may also question each
other and comment on the testimony of the other experts while
on the stand. The judge may also pose questions during this part
of the proceedings or ask the experts to comment on speciﬁc
topics or issues. The second phase of concurrent testimony functions more like typical cross-examination, with lawyers leading
the questioning process during that phase (Edmond, 2008, 2009;
Freckelton, 2005).
Proponents have argued that the close proximity created through
hot tubbing promotes expert neutrality by increasing experts’ independence from their retaining parties and greater reliance on their
professional identities (Edmond, 2008, 2009; Garbis, 2003). When
an issue is relevant to an individual’s ingroup, that individual is
more likely to engage in systematic processing of the message
content (Crano, 2000; Mackie, 1986; Mackie et al., 1990). In the
context of expert testimony, one would therefore expect concurrent experts engaging in hot tubbing to experience less dissonance
between their roles as advocates and their ethical responsibility to
be nonpartisan. If experts experience less dissonance and their
identity as an impartial expert becomes the forefront identity,
experts should be less likely to engage in conﬁrmation bias and
adversarial allegiance and should instead engage in more thorough
processing of the evidence. Surveys of judges, experts, and legal
professionals have generally been quite favorable and support this
view, suggesting experts are perceived to be less partisan when
using concurrent procedures (e.g., AAT, 2005; Civil Justice Council, 2016; Downes, 2004).

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

232

PERILLO, PERILLO, DESPODOVA, AND KOVERA

On the one hand, this shift toward expert impartiality should mean
experts’ reports would be less partisan. These reports would seemingly be more comprehensive, including more acknowledgments of
other sides, counterarguments, limitations of experts’ ultimate opinions. On the other hand, it is unclear how this shift may affect the testimony process. Concurrent expert testimony is speciﬁcally set up to
restrict testimony at court to the areas of disagreement and the reasons for the disagreement (Kristjanson, 2012). Even if experts’
reports are less biased and display less adversarial allegiance, their
testimony is nonetheless likely to skew toward justifying one’s own
position as opposed to acknowledging its weaknesses, which may
undermine its usefulness. This view is consistent with some of the
stated criticisms of concurrent testimony that have said it may still
produce a skewed view of the case on the stand (Davies, 2004; Kristjanson, 2012; Martire & Edmond, 2017).

Overview of Present Study and Hypotheses
Although there have been repeated calls to incorporate concurrent
expert testimony into American trials (e.g., Prescott & Fadgen, 2019;
Reifert, 2011; Welch, 2010) and those calls have been successful in
limited areas (Devitt, 2012; Emmerig et al., 2013; Wood, 2018); little
is known about the actual impact of the concurrent testimony process
on experts’ decision-making processes. Using the context of a criminal
responsibility (insanity) evaluation and examining expert opinions
across phases of the evaluation (from recruitment through testimony),
the current study was designed to test whether concurrent expert testimony would lead experts to generate less biased opinions than the typical adversarial process. We manipulated whether experts testiﬁed
using the adversarial, concurrent, or court-appointed process (type).
We assigned the non-court-appointed experts to testify for the prosecution or defense (side) based on a measure of their preexisting leaning
toward one side or the other. We examined the effects of these variables on experts’ responsibility decisions, ratings of the case evidence,
content of expert reports and testimony, and level of cognitive dissonance. The City University of New York Human Research Protections
Program (HRPP) provided ethical approval for the study.
Hypothesis 1: Given strong existing evidence for adversarial allegiance, we predicted that defense experts would render more not
criminally responsible judgments and rate the defendant lower in
criminal responsibility than would prosecution experts.
Hypothesis 2: We expected that over time, adversarial allegiance effects on experts’ responsibility judgments and responsibility ratings would be heightened for adversarial experts and
attenuated for concurrent experts. We expected court-appointed
experts’ ratings would not change over time.
Hypothesis 3: Given adversarial allegiance is likely driven by
cognitive dissonance, we predicted that testimony type and phase
would inﬂuence participants’ self-reported level of dissonance,
with adversarial and concurrent experts reporting higher levels of
dissonance than court-appointed experts. We expected that over
time dissonance ratings would increase for adversarial experts,
decrease for concurrent experts, and remain unchanged for courtappointed experts.
We also hypothesized testimony type (adversarial or concurrent) would inﬂuence the content of experts’ reports and testimony. These hypotheses (Hypotheses 4–8) and the results related
to them are available in the online supplemental materials.

Method
Participants
Participants (N = 103) were 42 clinicians (M age = 46.05 years;
SD = 11.63; 64.29% female; 92.68% White; 4.76% Hispanic; M
years since doctorate = 16.17 years; SD = 11.63) and 61 clinical
psychology doctoral students (M age = 29.45 years; SD = 5.30;
85.25% female; 78.69% White; 19.67% Hispanic; M year-long
externships completed = 2.48; SD = 1.35) recruited from New
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas (see Table 1 for additional demographic information and professional qualiﬁcations for both samples). We required the doctoral students to have at least 1 year of
doctoral-level clinical practicum experience and have completed
at least one report on a full clinical evaluation. We compensated
participants for their participation in the study.
Eighty-seven participants completed the ﬁrst set of measures
in the study during Phase 2, and 51 participants completed the
second set of measures during Phase 3. Forty-eight participants
completed all four phases of the study and were included in the
analyses exploring attitude change across the phases of the
study. For an overview of the study ﬂow and participant exclusion across the study phases, see Figure 1.
There was no signiﬁcant difference in the proportion of participants excluded for their opinion not matching their hiring side
between the adversarial (29.03%) and concurrent (42.50%) conditions, v2(1) = .85, p = .36, V = .13, 95% CI [.00, .37].

Table 1
Demographic Information by Participant Type
Clinicians (n = 42)
Educational background
PhD in psychology
PsyD in psychology
MD
Licensed clinician
Forensic training experience
Postdoctoral fellowship in forensic psychology
Continuing education in forensic evaluation
Forensic concentration in doctoral program
Psychology practica in forensic setting
Employment setting
State hospital
Private practice
Prison
Faculty
Testimony experience
Testify for prosecution
Testify for defense

n

%

29
12
1
35

69.05
28.57
2.38
83.33

9
29
12
14

21.43
69.05
28.57
33.33

7
22
13
11

16.67
52.38
30.95
26.19

10
18

23.81
42.86

n
61
61
61
n
58
61

M
2.48
0.41
2.41
Mdn
13.00
3.00

Students (n = 61)
Number of practica completed
At least 8 months long
Fewer than 8 months
With adult populations
Number completed
Clinical reports
Forensic evaluations

SD
1.35
0.64
1.38
IQR
18.25
10.00

Note. Clinician employment setting does not equal to 100%, because
some participants were employed in multiple settings.

TESTING THE WATERS

233

Figure 1
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Survey Flow Showing Participant Completion and Materials by Study Phase

Design
The study had a 2 (side: prosecution vs. defense) 3 2 (testimony
type: adversarial vs. concurrent) þ 1 (testimony type control: courtappointed) factorial design. We assigned participants to side based

on their responses to the forensic bias questionnaire. We randomly
assigned all participants to a testimony type condition.
Our power analysis indicated a sample size of 48 would give
power of .80 to detect a medium effect (f = .20) for the test of
the 2 3 3 design across the three points of measurement if the
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dependent measures had correlations of .70 (calculated using
G*Power, Faul et al., 2007).

Procedure
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Training

participating in a novel concurrent trial process at this time if
assigned to that condition. Participants provided informed consent
online and then reviewed the case materials and videotaped interviews with the defendant in the order speciﬁed in the instruction
sheets. Participants then completed the defendant evaluation questionnaire and the dissonance affect questionnaire.

We recruited participants to participate in a study of clinical decision making in the legal system focusing on criminal responsibility;
we told them that they would be evaluating a mock case rather than
conducting a real evaluation. We pulled names of potential doctorallevel clinicians in the greater New York area through professional
association directories, state expert lists, and Internet searches. We
then emailed these clinicians with invitations to participate. We
recruited doctoral students from doctoral programs in clinical psychology in the greater New York City area, Pennsylvania, and
Texas. The advertisements directed participants to a website where
participants provided informed consent and completed the clinical
background questionnaire and forensic bias questionnaire. Participants also provided contact information so they could be contacted
to participate if eligible. Of the 112 participants who fully completed
the screener questionnaire, nine were excluded from participation
because they did not meet eligibility requirements.
Participants next completed an APA-approved self-paced online
continuing education course on criminal responsibility. We provided all participants with a copy of Evaluation of Criminal
Responsibility (Packer, 2009) as study material for the course and
a reference to use while completing the study. We required participants provide their completion certiﬁcate for the course before beginning Phase 1 of the study.

We then invited all court-appointed experts and those adversarial and concurrent experts whose opinions matched the side for
which they had been hired to complete an expert report by their respective attorney or the judicial assistant. After participants provided informed consent online, we gave participants a 75-min
timeframe to complete the report. Given time constraints, we
asked them to focus on the clinical formulation and diagnosis, the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offense, and
their overall impression regarding the defendant’s criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offense. We also asked participants to include psychosocial history and current mental status,
time permitting. We told participants they could provide the latter
portions of the report in bullet points to save time if necessary. We
asked participants to write their report and email a copy to their respective attorney or the judicial assistant (depending on condition).
We also reminded participants in the adversarial and concurrent
conditions that the attorneys’ satisfaction with their reports would
determine whether they would be invited to provide testimony. After completing the report, participants completed the defendant
evaluation questionnaire, the report satisfaction questionnaire, and
the dissonance affect questionnaire.

Phase 1

Phase 3

Once we categorized participants as proprosecution or prodefense (based on their responses to the forensic issues and background questionnaires) and they completed the training, we
randomly assigned them to the concurrent, adversarial, or courtappointed expert condition. We contacted participants via email to
inform them that expert proﬁles had been generated based on their
responses to the questions in the clinical background questionnaire
and these ﬁles had been given to the attorneys or judge (only for
court-appointed experts) in the case. We asked participants to provide ideal times for contact via telephone should they be selected
as experts in the case.
Two practicing attorneys working on the project contacted the
adversarial and concurrent experts assigned to their respective sides.
Using a script, the attorneys described the case and requested the
participants’ assistance in the case as an expert witness. If the participants agreed to participate, we sent them an instruction sheet
and case materials via e-mail to review for the case from the attorney for their side. A research assistant posing as an assistant to the
mock judge in the case contacted participants in the court-appointed
condition to request their assistance as court-appointed experts.
These participants received the instruction sheet and case materials
from the judge’s assistant on behalf of the judge.
Prior to reviewing materials, we told participants in the adversarial and concurrent conditions that the attorneys had the right to
terminate experts at any time, so their opinions would determine
whether the attorneys asked the experts to write an expert report or
testify in the case. We also informed participants they would be

We then invited via email all court-appointed experts and those
adversarial and concurrent participants whose opinions matched
the side for which they had been hired to come in to provide testimony. We scheduled court-appointed experts to testify individually. We randomly paired adversarial and concurrent experts with
an expert in the same testimony condition but from the opposing
side. After testimony was scheduled, we sent the adversarial and
concurrent participants the report of their opposing experts via email for review before the testimony phase.
We scheduled participants in the concurrent condition in pairs.
Only one pair in the study involved a clinician-student pairing.
Upon arrival to the research laboratory, we gave concurrent expert
pairs copies of their individual reports and asked them to generate
a joint report for the court outlining areas of agreement and disagreement. We gave the pairs a 30-min timeframe, and we video
recorded the sessions. Participants completed the report satisfaction questionnaire upon completion of the joint report and before
providing testimony.
We video recorded all testimony, which the experts provided in
mock courtrooms. Participants in the concurrent condition testiﬁed
together on the stand. Participants sat in the witness box together,
and the judge (played by a doctoral student) provided an overview
of the concurrent testimony process. The judge provided the topics
of discussion based on the pairs’ joint reports to the court and
asked the pairs to discuss their areas of disagreement about the
case. The judge and attorneys followed ﬂexible scripts to ask additional questions of the experts.

Phase 2

TESTING THE WATERS
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Court-appointed and adversarial participants testiﬁed individually on the stand. For the court-appointed participants, the attorney
whose case beneﬁted the most from their opinion conducted the
direct examination. For the adversarial participants, the attorney
who hired them conducted the direct examination. The opposing
attorney then conducted cross-examination. The attorneys followed ﬂexible scripts during the questioning phase.
After providing testimony, participants completed the defendant
evaluation questionnaire, the testimony satisfaction questionnaire,
and the dissonance affect questionnaire. Concurrent experts also
completed the opposing expert questionnaire. After completing the
questionnaires, we thanked, debriefed, and compensated all participants for their participation.

Materials
All materials are available on OSF: https://osf.io/u23tc/.

Clinical Background Questionnaire
Participants completed the clinical background questionnaire
online to apply for the study. Clinicians reported their educational experience, forensic training experience, current employment status, and their forensic evaluation and expert testimony
experience. Students reported their current and former educational experience, doctoral-level practicum experience, forensic
training experience, and clinical assessment and report writing
experience. We asked both samples to indicate if they would
have any reservations serving as a defense or prosecution expert
witness, and they provided demographic information, including
gender, age, and racial/ethnic background.

Forensic Issues Questionnaire
Participants rated their agreement with 12 items measuring attitudes toward forensic issues (e.g., “Defendants are unlikely to malinger mental illness to avoid prosecution.”) using a 7-point
Likert-type scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree). A
total score was created by summing the items, four of which were
reverse coded. Higher scores indicated more proprosecution leanings, whereas lower scores indicated more prodefense leanings.
We used median splits to assign participants to the prosecution or
defense. We assigned participants to the side they leaned toward
to capture the predispositions that affects experts’ willingness to
represent a particular side and may be an important component
leading to adversarial allegiance (Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015;
Neal, 2016) and increase the realism of the study. We calculated
the median split on the ﬁrst 20 participants (who were assigned to
a side after the median split was performed) and then updated as
additional participants enrolled in the study. Participants on the
median (ﬁnal median = 38.00) were randomly assigned to side.
The ﬁnal internal consistency of the scale was weak (a = .26).
Given the weakness of the scale, the court-appointed experts were
treated as a single group instead of separately analyzed as proprosecution or prodefense-leaning, so we did not use the results of
this questionnaire in analyses.

Case Materials
Participants received a packet of case materials to conduct a
criminal responsibility evaluation. Although all materials were
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ﬁctitious, they were based on an actual case that involved a criminal responsibility evaluation, and we consulted with forensic
psychologists throughout their development to maximize experimental realism. Table 2 provides an overview of the evaluation
materials. We video recorded the clinical interviews of the defendant prior to the study. The videos showed the defendant (an
advanced clinical doctoral student with acting experience) completing the clinical interviews in a testing room. We used multiple cameras to provide multiple perspectives of the defendant.
An advanced doctoral student with forensic evaluation experience conducted the interviews off camera, and we instructed participants to view the interviews as though they had conducted
them. We created two interviews: one included a comprehensive
psychosocial history and mental status examination, and the
other focused on discussion of the events and defendant’s experiences around the time of the alleged offense.
We pilot tested case materials to ensure the case was ambiguous
and did not inherently favor or oppose criminal responsibility
using a focus group of eight advanced clinical psychology doctoral
students with forensic experience. All students in the focus group
had completed a doctoral course in forensic assessment, had at
least 2 years external practicum experience, and had at least 1 year
of practicum experience in a forensic setting. Participants were
evenly split in their evaluation of the defendant after review of the
case materials. We also reviewed the materials with a forensic psychologist before implementation.

Defendant Evaluation Questionnaire
Participants completed a defendant evaluation questionnaire
after Phases 1 through 3 of the study. Participants rated their
strength of agreement with four statements pertaining to the
defendant’s meeting of criteria for criminal responsibility using
a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly
agree), with lower scores indicating greater responsibility.
We also asked the participants to indicate if they thought the defendant was criminally responsible (criminally responsible/not
criminally responsible).
Table 2
Summary of Case Materials Reviewed by Participants for the
Evaluation
Content
Summary records
Criminal indictment
Court order for evaluation
(court-appointed experts only)
Federal statute for criminal responsibility
Collateral records
Police incident report (current offense)
Defendant’s criminal record
Defendant’s psychiatric records
Phone interview with defendant’s mother
Observations from institutional staff
Evaluation materials
Clinical interview with defendant
Session 1: Psychosocial history
Session 2: Discussion of alleged offense
MMPI-2 testing results

Format
Document
Document
Document
Document
Document
Document
Summary notes
Summary notes
Video
Video
Testing materials
and output
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Participants then rated their conﬁdence in their criminal responsibility decision using a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all
conﬁdent; 10 = very conﬁdent). Finally, participants rated the
degree to which they felt the defendant was criminally responsible
(1 = not at all criminally responsible; 10 = very criminally responsible) and how strongly the evidence pointed toward criminal
responsibility (1 = strongly in favor of responsibility; 10 = strongly
in favor of no responsibility). We reverse-scored the question
about the degree to which the defendant was criminally responsible to ensure that lower scores indicated greater responsibility
(less insanity) across all items.
We combined ﬁve items (unaware of actions, did not understand
actions were wrong, could not conform behavior to the law, degree
of responsibility, and evidence strength) into a composite responsibility variable. The composite variable showed strong internal consistency across all three time points (McDonald’s xs= .86–.93).

Report Satisfaction Questionnaire
After completing the expert reports, we asked participants to
complete a report satisfaction questionnaire. Participants rated the
strength of their agreement with seven items measuring their satisfaction with the expert report (e.g., “I am very satisﬁed with the
ﬁnal report”), how closely the report reﬂects their case opinion
(e.g., “The ﬁnal report closely reﬂects my opinions in the case”),
and the objectivity of the report (e.g., “I evaluated the evidence
objectively during the generation of the ﬁnal report”) using a 10point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly
agree). When rating their joint reports, concurrent experts completed an additional four items evaluating the process of working
with another expert to create the report (e.g., “I worked well with
the other expert while generating the report”) using the same Likert-type scale.

Testimony Satisfaction Questionnaire
We asked all experts to complete a testimony satisfaction questionnaire following their testimony in Phase 3. Participants rated
the strength of their agreement with 24 statements regarding the
testimony process. Participants rated their satisfaction with the
process (e.g., “I am very satisﬁed with my expert testimony”),
their objectivity (e.g., “My testimony favored the side that hired
me”), the value of their testimony (e.g., “My opinions were valued”), their effectiveness (e.g., “My testimony was effective”),
their convincingness (e.g., “A jury would favor the side that hired
me”), their perceived control over their testimony (e.g., “I did not
have much control over the content of my testimony”), and their
enjoyment with the testimony process (e.g., “I enjoyed giving
expert testimony”) using 10-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly
disagree; 10 = strongly agree). Participants also rated their familiarity with the testimony procedures on a 10-point Likert-type
scale, with higher scores indicating greater familiarity with the
procedures.

Opposing Expert Questionnaire
After completing the testimony satisfaction questionnaire,
experts in the concurrent condition rated the expert they opposed
in the case. We did not ask the experts in the adversarial condition
to rate the opposing experts, because they did not witness the
opposing expert’s testimony. Participants rated their strength of

agreement with 15 statements about the expert’s qualiﬁcations
(e.g., “The opposing expert had specialized knowledge relevant to
this case”), level of bias (e.g., “The opposing expert was advocated for the side that hired him/her”), effectiveness (e.g., “The
opposing expert would persuade a jury”), respectfulness (e.g.,
“The opposing expert was combative”), and testimony clarity
(e.g., “The opposing expert’s testimony was clear”) using 10-point
Likert-type scales (1 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree).

Dissonance Affect Questionnaire
Participants completed the dissonance measure at the end of
each phase after completing the defendant evaluation questionnaire and satisfaction measures. The measure consists of 24 items
that represent different emotions, three related to the feeling of
cognitive dissonance and additional ﬁller items (Elliot & Devine,
1994). Participants rate how much they are feeling each emotion
at the present moment using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = does
not apply at all; 7 = applies very much). We created the composite
measure of discomfort using the same subset of three items
(uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered; McDonald’s xs= .87–.92) used
in previous research.

Manipulation Check Questions
Participants completed a set of ﬁve manipulation checks questions after the testimony phase of the study. Participants indicated
the side for which they wrote an expert report (prosecution,
defense, or court-appointed), whether they wrote a report jointly
with an opposing expert (yes/no), for which side they testiﬁed
(prosecution, defense, or court-appointed), what testimony procedure was used (adversarial or concurrent), and whether the participant testiﬁed together on the stand with another expert or
separately (together, separate, or sole court-appointed witness).
Overall, participants were mostly accurate in responding to the
manipulation check questions; court-appointed experts tended to
mistake their testimony as being for a particular side despite
acknowledging they had written their reports as court-appointed
experts, but this may be because the attorney who was most
favored by their case evaluation conducted their direct examination. There were no other meaningful patterns.

Results
Criminal Responsibility Opinions
We conducted a hierarchical logistic regression predicting not
criminally responsible judgments with side and testimony type
added as predictors in the ﬁrst step and the interaction between the
factors in the second (see Table 3). For all Phase 1 analyses, we
ran analyses on the full data, including those later excluded from
the study. The ﬁrst model was signiﬁcant, v2(2) = 7.47, p = .02,
Nagelkerke R2 = .14. Side was a signiﬁcant predictor in the model,
with the odds of defense experts ﬁnding the defendant not criminally responsible being approximately four times higher compared
with the odds of the prosecution experts ﬁnding the defendant not
criminally responsible (see Table 4 for proportions). Adding the
interaction between side and testimony type did not signiﬁcantly
improve the ﬁt of the model, v2(1) = 1.14, p = .29, but the ﬁnal
model remained signiﬁcant, v2(3) = 8.60, p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 =
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Table 3
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Predicting Participants’ Initial Criminal Responsibility Judgments by Expert Side and Testimony Type
Predictors
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Model 1
Constant
Side
Testimony type
Model 2
Constant
Side
Testimony type
Side 3 Testimony Type

B

SE

Wald

p

Exp(B)

95% CI

0.01
1.40
0.08

0.44
0.54
0.53

0.00
6.84
0.03

.988
.009
.873

0.99
4.07
0.92

[1.42, 11.66]
[0.33, 2.57]

0.25
2.12
0.35
1.19

0.50
0.91
0.67
1.14

0.25
5.43
0.27
1.09

.618
.020
.603
.296

0.78
8.36
1.41
0.31

[1.40, 49.88]
[0.38, 5.23]
[0.03, 2.83]

Note. Regression is predicting judgments of not responsible (insane). The reference category for side is prosecution experts (vs. defense); the reference
category for testimony type is adversarial experts (vs. concurrent). Significant predictors are in bold.

.16. Again, side remained the only signiﬁcant predictor in the
model. As predicted, there was no impact of testimony type in participants’ initial evaluations. These results support Hypothesis 1.
We conducted a generalized logit model with generalized estimating equations using an unstructured correlation matrix to
account for the repeated nature of the data with a binary outcome; however, the model did not achieve convergence. As can
be seen in Table 4, however, the proportions of not responsible
judgments only strengthened in allegiance effects over time for
both adversarial and concurrent experts. These results failed to
support Hypothesis 2.

Strength of Criminal Responsibility Opinions
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a 2 (side: prosecution vs. defense) 3
2 (testimony type: adversarial vs. concurrent) ANOVA showed no
signiﬁcant differences between adversarial and concurrent experts
on their initial composite criminal responsibility opinions, F(1,
67) = .43, p = .52, d = .16, 95% CI [.31, .63], and no signiﬁcant
side by testimony type interaction, F(1, 67) = .11, p = .74, hp2 =
.002. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of side on participants’
initial criminal responsibility opinions, F(1, 67) = 9.52, p = .003,
d = .76, 95% CI [.28, 1.24]. As hypothesized, defense experts
more strongly agreed that the defendant was not criminally responsible (i.e., was insane; M = 6.76, SD = 1.65) than did prosecution experts (M = 5.42, SD = 1.87), regardless of whether they
were adversarial or concurrent experts.
Participants again rated their perceptions of criminal responsibility after completing their expert reports and after providing testimony. To evaluate whether adversarial experts’ opinions
diverged and concurrent experts’ opinions converged over time, a
2 (side) 3 2 (expert type) 3 3 (evaluation phase) mixed ANOVA

was conducted on the participants who completed evaluations
across all three phases of the study (see Table 5).
In contrast with Hypothesis 2, there was no signiﬁcant main
effect of evaluation time, F(2, 60) = .96, p = .39, hp2 = .03, and no
signiﬁcant interactions including evaluation time (ps $ .72), suggesting participants’ opinions did not signiﬁcantly change over the
study phases. There was no signiﬁcant difference between adversarial and concurrent experts, F(1, 30) = .05, p = .83, d = .04, 95%
CI [.64, .71], nor a signiﬁcant side by testimony type interaction,
F(1, 30) = .82, p = .37, hp2 = .03; however, there was a signiﬁcant
main effect for side, F(1, 30) = 118.77, p , .001, d = 1.87, 95%
CI [1.06, 2.67]. Just as in Phase 1 alone, defense participants (M =
7.53, SE = .24) rated the case more strongly in favor of no criminal
responsibility (or insanity) across all phases of the study as compared to prosecution experts (M = 3.83, SE = .24).
We analyzed the data using a repeated-measures one-way
ANOVA. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, v2(2) = 8.79, p = .01, so the GreenhouseGeisser correction was used (e = .66). Consistent with Hypothesis
2, the repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant main
effect of time on court-appointed experts’ opinions, F(1.32, 17.11) =
.12, p = .80, hp2 = .01. Across the three phases of the study, participants consistently rated the defendant’s responsibility as relatively
moderate (see Table 5).

Cognitive Dissonance During Evaluation
As we did not hypothesize that side would play a role in the experience of cognitive dissonance, we did not include this variable
as a predictor in the analyses. In contrast to Hypothesis 3, a oneway ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant difference in dissonance ratings among court-appointed, adversarial, and concurrent experts,

Table 4
Percentage of Not Responsible Judgments (Insanity) by Condition and Phase
Expert type
Adversarial
Concurrent
Court-appointed

Side
Prosecution
Defense
Prosecution
Defense

Phase 1
% Not responsible

N

Phase 2
% Not responsible

N

Phase 3
% Not responsible

N

43.75
86.67
52.38
73.68
50.00

16
15
21
19
16

0.00
100.00
0.00
90.91
61.54

8
10
9
11
13

0.00
75.00
0.00
100.00
46.15

8
8
9
9
13
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Table 5
Participants’ Criminal Responsibility Ratings by Expert Side, Testimony Type, and Phase
Testimony type
Adversarial
Concurrent

Side

Phase 1 M (SD)

Phase 2 M (SD)

Phase 3 M (SD)

Prosecution (n = 8)
Defense (n = 8)
Prosecution (n = 9)
Defense (n = 9)

4.18 (1.02)
7.38 (1.27)
3.82 (0.90)
7.80 (1.09)
5.83 (1.47)

3.90 (0.66)
7.28 (1.71)
3.44 (0.90)
7.60 (1.42)
5.97 (2.23)

3.98 (0.63)
7.58 (1.46)
3.64 (0.63)
7.53 (1.43)
5.77 (2.06)

Court-appointed (n = 14)
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Note. Higher scores indicate greater lack of responsibility (more insanity) on a 10-point Likert-type scale. Only participants who completed all three
phases of the research study are included in the table.

F(2, 84) = .02, p = .98, hp2 , .01. Instead, experts across all testimony types reported a moderate level of dissonance overall.
There was a signiﬁcant time by testimony type interaction, F(4,
90) = 2.91, p = .03, hp2 = .12; however, the pattern of results did
not follow the direction speciﬁed in Hypothesis 3 (see Table 6).
Bonferroni post hoc tests showed court-appointed experts reported
signiﬁcantly lower dissonance when submitting the expert report
(Phase 2) than when they had previously evaluated the case materials (Phase 1), Mdiff = 1.38, SE = .41, p = .004, d = .67, 95%
CI [1.43, .09], but there was no signiﬁcant change in dissonance
from submitting the report to providing testimony (Phase 3),
Mdiff = .55, SE = .43, p = .63, d = .29, 95% CI [1.03, .46]. In
contrast, adversarial experts reported no signiﬁcant changes in discomfort from Phase 1 to Phase 2, Mdiff = .48, SE = .38, p = .65,
d = .38, 95% CI [1.08, .32], or from Phase 2 to Phase 3,
Mdiff = .48, SE = .40, p = .72, d = .57, 95% CI [.38, 1.02]. Likewise, concurrent experts reported no signiﬁcant changes in discomfort from Phase 1 to Phase 2, Mdiff = .02, SE = .36, p = 1.00,
d = .01, 95% CI [.67, .64], or from Phase 2 to Phase 3, Mdiff =
.48, SE = .38, p = .63, d = .48, 95% CI [.19, 1.14].

Discussion
The purpose of the current investigation was to examine whether
the concurrent expert testimony process would ameliorate adversarial
allegiance and promote expert neutrality as compared with the typical
adversarial process. Overall, the results suggest concurrent testimony
did not produce beneﬁts at any phase of the expert decision-making
process. Our ﬁndings did support Hypothesis 1, as experts’ initial
case opinions and responsibility judgments were skewed toward the
side that hired them, consistent with adversarial allegiance. In contrast with Hypothesis 2, however, the effects of adversarial allegiance
remained apparent and stable for experts assigned to concurrent
expert testimony even after these concurrent experts were exposed to
the opposing side. Participants in the prosecution conditions consistently viewed the defendant as more responsible than did those in the
defense conditions, regardless of whether they were in the traditional

adversarial system or in the hot tub. Likewise, in contrast to Hypothesis 3, reports of cognitive dissonance did not differ between adversarial and concurrent experts. As discussed in the online supplemental
materials, we also did not see beneﬁts of concurrent expert testimony
in the experts’ reports or testimony.
The current study found no evidence to support the conclusion that
concurrent expert testimony reduces adversarial allegiance. In this case
simulation, experts interpreted case information and presented their
opinions similarly—whether in the traditional adversarial process or
the hot tub—in a way that favored the side that originally hired them.
These results raise questions about the effectiveness of concurrent
expert testimony, or hot tubbing, that future research should address.
Our results suggest court-appointed experts achieved more balance than experts retained by a speciﬁc side; their mean case ratings and perceptions often lay directly between the prosecution
and defense witnesses’ ratings. These results must be interpreted
with caution, however; in the court-appointed condition, participants reporting both proprosecution attitudes and prodefense attitudes were included. Given the poor reliability of the scale used to
assign individuals as proprosecution or prodefense leaning, analyses on whether the experts expressed opinions in line with their
original predispositions was not possible; however, it should be
noted that the variance in ratings for the court-appointed condition
tended to be greater than the variance in the adversarial and concurrent conditions. This higher variance suggests these middle
ground ratings may be due to the mixing of attitudes in this condition as opposed to any attenuation of bias. It appears courtappointed expert testimony may simply allow an expert to operate
based on their preexisting biases rather than working toward neutrality (Sonenshein & Fitzpatrick, 2013; Yarnall, 2009).

Why the Hot Tub Might Not Reduce Adversarial
Allegiance
If concurrent testimony does not reduce adversarial allegiance
as the current study suggests, one potential reason may involve the
timing of when concurrent procedures are implemented in the

Table 6
Participants’ Dissonance Ratings by Testimony Type and Evaluation Phase
Testimony type

Phase 1
M (SD)

Phase 2
M (SD)

Phase 3
M (SD)

Adversarial (n = 16)
Concurrent (n = 18)
Court-appointed (n = 14)

3.29 (1.94)
3.48 (1.80)
3.69 (1.67)

3.77 (1.93)
3.50 (1.83)
2.31 (1.56)

3.29 (1.63)
3.02 (1.61)
2.86 (1.36)

Note. Higher scores indicate greater dissonance on a 7-point composite measure. Only participants who completed all three phases of the research study
are included in the table.
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expert testimony process. Although we told our concurrent expert
witnesses about the concurrent testimony procedures and warned
they would be directly interacting with an expert witness on the
stand before reviewing the case materials, they still examined the
relevant case evidence, formulated their opinions, and wrote expert
reports before ever directly interacting with the opposing expert
(which mimics actual concurrent testimony procedures; Downes,
2004). Not actually interacting with an opposing expert until late in
the process may have attenuated any potential beneﬁts. Moreover,
concurrent expert witnesses interacted directly with their own attorneys prior to case review and as they moved through the expert testimony process. Research on cognitive commitment suggests that
initial commitment to a particular side can be particularly powerful
in activating cognitive dissonance if one chooses an action incompatible with a need or desire (Brehm & Cohen, 1962).
In the case of expert testimony, the initial agreement to serve a
particular side could lead to cognitive dissonance between the competing motivations to be an impartial expert and an advocate for a
particular side in the case. As experts then go on to produce products
(i.e., opinions, reports, testimony) to support a particular side, they
may experience escalating commitment, which increases cognitive
dissonance even further (Joule & Azdia, 2003). By having experts
collaborate on a joint report and testify together, we had expected
concurrent expert testimony would shift experts to identify with the
opposing expert rather than an adversarial side, as their expert
ingroup should be a more important frame of reference. Although
concurrent experts generally rated their opposing experts favorably
(e.g., high levels of agreement that the opposing expert was knowledgeable, respectful, helpful, and relevant), they also perceived
opposing experts as advocates for their side and disagreed with those
opposing experts’ opinions.
Although proponents of hot tubbing have said it may fail to
reduce bias (e.g., Kristjanson, 2012), the lack of bias reduction has
typically been acknowledged in the context of experts failing to
respect one another (i.e., social identiﬁcation failures). Our results
suggest that even when the experts respect one another, it may not
be sufﬁcient to shift commitment to the impartial expert role. Part
of this problem may be due to the bias blind spot (Pronin et al.,
2002; Zapf et al., 2018), or the tendency to perceive bias on the
part of others but fail to acknowledge it in oneself. If experts
indeed only see other experts as the biased ones, it may preclude
social identiﬁcation with a neutral expert identity.
Premature commitment to a side by agreeing to serve as an
expert—or providing an initial case opinion before reviewing all
of the evidence—may exert stronger inﬂuences that persist despite
any potential social identity concerns brought up by expert testimony (Neal & Grisso, 2014). When individuals are encouraged to
accept initial information as fact without critical consideration,
individuals may engage in mindless processing of later information that ﬁts that bias (Chanowitz & Langer, 1981). Moreover,
experts are likely to engage in conﬁrmation bias to maintain that
initial belief (Neal & Grisso, 2014). How attorneys initially frame
the case to prospective witnesses could therefore have an immense
impact on experts if they do not examine that framing critically.

Limitations
There were limitations to the study worth noting. First, a number of experts were excluded from the study after Phase 1 because
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they did not provide an evaluation that beneﬁted the side which
was hiring them, which could artiﬁcially inﬂate the appearance of
expert bias. We believe this to be unlikely, however, given the
consistent pattern of ﬁndings in each phase of the study, including
Phase 1. Most of the participants excluded for forming opinions
that did not support their side were excluded immediately after
Phase 1. Given the adversarial allegiance effect was just as strong
in Phase 1 with those individuals included as in the latter phases of
the study, it is unlikely that the continued adversarial allegiance
effects were due to the removal of inconsistent experts. Moreover,
this pressure to conform with one’s side is a typical part of the
expert process (Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015), and we felt it was important to model this aspect of the process, as it may partially contribute to adversarial allegiance.
A small sample completed the full version of the study, so caution should be taken when interpreting the ﬁndings. Nonetheless,
the repeated measures nature of the design increased our power,
and the ﬁndings provided a robust replication of the adversarial allegiance effects found in prior research (e.g., Murrie et al., 2008,
2009, 2013). Given we expected to ﬁnd null results in the concurrent testimony condition but instead replicated the adversarial allegiance effect, it appears sample size may not be a major issue in
this particular study or that any beneﬁcial effects of concurrent
procedures may be impractically small. However, our effect sizes
may be inﬂated due to the small sample size; future research
should replicate these results with a larger sample size. Similarly,
the sample composition limits the conclusions from the study.
Although we attempted to recruit as many practicing clinicians as
possible for this study, the involved nature of the study (including
providing in-person testimony) meant many clinicians were unable
to participate and the sample primarily included student participants. Many of the students were recruited from clinical psychology doctoral programs with a forensic emphasis, but students still
may not fully represent how clinicians would have behaved professionally in actual expert testimony situations.
The format of the study also limits the conclusions that can be
drawn. Although the study was designed to be as realistic as possible, including referral and questioning by actual attorneys and
materials developed from an actual case, participants were still
aware they were participating in a mock criminal responsibility
evaluation for a research study. Knowing they were participating
in a study may have reduced pressure to act in an ethical, unbiased
manner. Likewise, we limited experts to the materials we provided, and we implemented time limits on the writing of expert
reports and provision of testimony that do not exist in actual case
evaluations. It is possible having more time to review the case
materials and carefully consider expert opinions could have led to
a reduction in bias. Future researchers may wish to examine
whether more naturalistic evaluations with more ﬂexible time
frames allow experts to be more cautious and considered in their
approach in ways that attenuate bias.

Directions for Future Research
Several future research directions might offer insight into ways
to reduce adversarial allegiance, with or without concurrent expert
testimony. A shift in some Australian courts toward a joint conference approach seems to acknowledge the importance of timing
when the concurrent expert experience happens. The joint
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conference approach has opposing experts meet together after their
initial brieﬁngs by their respective attorneys but before looking at
the evidence or writing expert reports (Rackemann, 2011). Similar
to preregistration for empirical research (a practice gaining support
for reducing certain forms of experimenter bias; Nosek et al.,
2018), the experts must work together to outline the proper methodology for evaluating the evidence and share the resulting data
with one another to form their case opinions. Although both joint
conferences and hot tubbing result in a joint report for the court
outlining areas of agreement and disagreement, this approach further differs from hot tubbing by completely removing the lawyers
from the process and allowing the joint conference to be completely conﬁdential (Wood, 2007b). The experts are also not
expected to testify concurrently on the stand. An evaluation of
cases using the joint conference approach suggests this earlier contact outside the inﬂuence of attorneys may be important for reducing adversarial allegiance, as 48% of the cases were resolved by
complete agreement between experts during this joint report process (Sutherland, 2011). Likewise, in our own study, most of the
experts who reported attitudes inconsistent with their hiring party
did so at the very beginning of the case before anything was put
into writing, which supports the importance of intervening earlier
in the testimony process. Future research should investigate
whether the impact of the initial framing persists when experts are
confronted with an opposing expert much earlier in the testimony
process.
One major recommended reform meriting empirical investigation has been masked referral of expert testimony (Robertson,
2010). Under this process, experts would not know which side has
hired them, and the initial case information is provided via intermediaries. Of course, the initial framing of that information can
have a great deal of impact on experts, because the assumption is
that masked referrals should include a neutral presentation. This
expectation of neutrality increases the likelihood that experts
would accept it uncritically. If the case information is carefully
balanced, it may promote the desired critical processing, but a biased frame may lead to conﬁrmation bias that still creates adversarial allegiance.
Future research should also consider how the concurrent process
inﬂuences experts as they gain experience with it. One possibility is
that concurrent expert testimony will reduce adversarial allegiance
as experts become more familiar with it. Identiﬁcation with opposing experts may be more likely to happen as experts gain familiarity
with the concurrent process, because they should be more likely to
identify with the opposing experts from the outset. If experts who
have experienced concurrent testimony previously are asked to
engage in that process again, they may be more likely to examine
that initial evidence more skeptically, even when presented in the
traditional manner from one’s hiring attorney. Although there is no
current research on whether concurrent experts have come to
greater agreement over time, research on the joint conference, or
case management, approach found that experts from opposing parties reaching full agreement in a case increased from 39% to 66%
over 3 years (Sutherland, 2011), suggesting that greater familiarity
might lead to greater allegiance reduction. Future research should
explore whether concurrent expert testimony is more effective with
individuals who have previous experience in this method as compared to experts new to testifying under concurrent procedures.

Conclusions
Altogether, our preliminary ﬁndings seem to echo the concerns
of Gary Edmond (2009, p. 186): “Concurrent evidence is not a
panacea for partisanship, adversarial bias, or the difﬁculties created by expert disagreement and decision making in the face of
uncertainty.” Although judges and attorneys have responded
favorably to hot tubbing and perceive results from it as less biased
(Civil Justice Council, 2016; Downes, 2004), there is no empirical
evidence that supports its effectiveness. This initial study indeed
suggests concurrent expert opinions may not be signiﬁcantly different from those produced under typical adversarial expert processes. Despite continued calls to integrate concurrent expert
testimony more completely into the American justice system (e.g.,
Wood, 2007a, 2018), it is premature to promote concurrent expert
testimony as a remedy for adversarial allegiance. Rather than
jumping in the hot tub, more research should test the waters by
examining the efﬁcacy of concurrent expert testimony.
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